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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes China’s pension arrangement and notes
that China has recently established a universal non-contributory
pension plan covering urban non-employed workers and all
rural residents, combined with the pension plan covering
urban employees already in place. Further, in the latest reform,
China has discontinued the special pension plan for civil ser-
vants and integrated this privileged welfare class into the urban
old-age pension insurance program. With these steps, China has
achieved a degree of universalism and integration of its pension
arrangement unprecedented in the non-Western world. Despite
this radical pension transformation strategy, we argue that the
current Chinese pension arrangement represents a case of
“incomplete” universalism. First, its benefit level is low.
Moreover, the benefit level varies from region to region.
Finally, universalism in rural China has been undermined due
to the existence of the “policy bundle.” Additionally, we argue
that the 2015 pension reform has created a situation in which
the stratification of Chinese pension arrangements has been
“flattened,” even though it remains stratified to some extent.
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Introduction
In 2000, the number of people aged 60 and older reached 10% of the total
Chinese population, making China an aging society according to interna-
tionally recognized standards (Benbo, 2002). China is widely recognized as a
nation that is “growing old before getting rich” (Booth, 2013; Frasier, 2013).
China has undergone a significant and rapid demographic transformation,
which has led to an increasingly top-heavy population pyramid, that is,
percentage of elderly people versus working-aged population. Therefore, a
comprehensive social protection system for the elderly provided by the
government has become one of the most pressing concerns for the country
with the largest elderly population in the world (Liu & Sun, 2014). In this
article, we shed light on recent developments in China’s pension arrange-
ment, since this issue has been little researched as yet, particularly within
international academia. Beyond providing an introduction to pension
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reform, we also explore and analyze the institutional transition of the
Chinese pension arrangement.
It is encouraging to find that recently China has established a universal
non-contributory pension covering urban non-employed workers and rural
residents, combined with an old-age insurance program covering urban
employees. The new target of this social pension scheme is the full coverage
of all Chinese citizens via a widening social safety net. Despite a strong
tendency toward universalism, the current Chinese pension arrangement
embodies a fragmentary nature. Various social groups, including rural resi-
dents, urban non-employed residents, and urban employees, enjoy different
pension benefits, which results in the stratification of social welfare.
However, we find that pension stratification has been flattened significantly
in recent years. For example, in January 2015, the pension program for civil
servants and public-sector employees was abolished, and they are now sub-
ject to the same pension rules as employees in enterprises.
In this article, we argue that the current Chinese pension arrangement
represents a case of incomplete universalism. Although the Chinese central
government has created a pension arrangement featuring universal coverage,
we find that (1) its benefit level is low; (2) the benefit level varies from region
to region; and (3) the phenomenon of the “policy bundle” (zheng ce kun
bang) is widespread among pension programs in rural China. These factors
make the so-called universal coverage weak and incomplete.
The pension arrangement in modern Chinese history
Old age security in urban areas: From labor insurance to social insurance
In China, the first old-age pension program was introduced soon after the
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PR China), when the
Communist government began to reform the country in the image of its
own Marxist-Leninist ideology. The central reform policies in the post-
revolutionary period concerned land reform, the collectivization of agricul-
ture, and the establishment of a labor insurance system. In 1951, the State
Council of PR China adopted the “Labor Insurance Regulation” (Dixon,
1981), which stipulated the creation of a comprehensive labor insurance
system protecting industrial workers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
against the social risks of illness, work accidents, disability, maternity, and
old age. The labor insurance contributions were paid solely by the SOE, and
all enterprises were legally obligated to transfer 30% of the contributions to
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). The ACFTU assumed
the responsibility to pool and redistribute the labor insurance funds at the
national level. In this period, industrial workers and civil servants in urban
regions were covered by an old-age protection program through their
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employment in SOEs and state administration. Customarily, each SOE was
responsible for paying out old-age pension benefits to employees who had
reached the statutory retirement age of, at the time, 60 years for men, 55 for
female civil servants, and 50 for female workers (Dixon, 1981; Mok, 1983).
The adoption of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978 was both a
social and economic turning point for modern China. The successor of Mao,
Deng Xiaoping and his reform-minded colleagues, declared the end of the
Maoist leftist course and steered the Chinese economy toward a more liberal,
market-oriented system. This recalibration of the economic course elimi-
nated the centrally planned economy and had a significant impact on social
protection in China. State-owned enterprises became responsible for their
own profits and losses, and they were increasingly considered independent
legal entities. The social pooling through the ACFTU had collapsed with the
market liberalizations, since now each enterprise—regardless of whether it
was an SOE, a private enterprise, or a joint venture—was responsible for
paying its employees’ pensions out of its own funds. As a result, SOEs whose
proportion of elderly employees was large found themselves in serious
financial difficulty, usually resulting in delayed pension payments. The pen-
sion burden in the wave of the privatization of SOEs thus became one of the
most serious social challenges since the adoption of a socialist market
economy (Feldstein, 1999). In fact, many bankrupted enterprises in China’s
heavily industrialized regions were unable to provide pensions for retirees. In
the 1980s and 1990s, these delayed and suspended pension payments led to
many demonstrations and protests by retirees in urban regions, jeopardizing
social cohesion and undermining the legitimacy of the Communist rule
(Chen & Rösner, 2000). Conventionally, the old-age grant for retirees had
been considered a reflection of the superiority of the Communist welfare
system and with that, the ruling party guaranteed the loyalty of the working
class to the Communist government. The pension arrangement and its
reform in urban China became a highly politicized and ideological issue
among the public because it so closely related to political stability and the
socialist legacy in China.
Since 1991, following a series of local pilot projects at the sub-national
level, the State Council of PR China endeavored to spread a two-pillar
pension arrangement for urban employees across the country, which was in
line with the mainstream trend of global pension reforms pushed by the
World Bank since 1994.1 The statutory pension arrangement labeled as a
partial funding system in the Chinese context was based overwhelmingly on
two pillars. The first was an earnings-based pension based on the pay-as-you-
go (PAYGO) principle, with a defined-benefit portion, and the second was a
defined-contribution portion that relied on mandatory individual savings
(Feldstein, 1999). Both pillars were income-centered and financed by the
contributions of employers and employees. The employers paid 20%, and
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employees 8%, of gross monthly earnings as old-age pension contributions
(Fan, 1999).2 In the initial stage of the creation of this modern old-age
insurance program, only a small number of employees were covered by the
new scheme. However, by 2005, roughly 55.2% of urban employed workers,
accounting for 30% of urban residents, were covered by this program (Liu,
2005). Since its inception, step-by-step, the old-age insurance program
incorporated more blue-collar and white-collar workers into this scheme.
The partial funding plan was considered an innovative way of instituting a
suitable pension model in China. The mainstream opinions of the scientific
community advocated the advantages of a partial funding plan (Chen &
Rösner, 2000; Fan, 1999; Liu, 2005). On the one hand, the PAYGO arrange-
ment can achieve the target of intergenerational transfer via social pooling;
on the other hand, the goal of funding contributes to the improvement of
personal responsibility and capital accumulation in individual pension
accounts. Compared to a single-pillar pension scheme, the two pillars of
the pension arrangement are flexible and sufficient to overcome the rigidity
of either the PAYGO arrangement or the full funding plan. The former is
highly associated with the dependency ratio and thus is easily prone to
population aging. Simultaneously, the latter is determined by the private
accumulation of funds, which easily results in inequality among retirees’
pensions. Another disadvantage of a full funding plan is its exposure to
fluctuation in the financial market. Various scholars believe that the partial
funding plan is a suitable model that combines the advantages of the PAYGO
arrangement and the full funding plan and eliminates their disadvantages
(Chen & Rösner, 2000).
One of the biggest challenges in adopting an additionally funded pension
is the guarantee of the current needs of pensioners who had never contrib-
uted to an individual pension account. Diversion of pension funds from
individual pension accounts by various local governments has been a policy
option to finance the needs of current retirees, causing the so-called problem
of “empty accounts.” In other words, the accumulation of pension funds
exists on paper in the accounts; however, in reality, the accounts are usually
empty because the funds have been diverted for the purpose of financing the
current demands of retirees.
Old age security in rural areas: Pilot projects and their failure
Compared with the urban old-age insurance system, the rural pension program
was a “latecomer.” Originally, traditional thinking did not endorse the creation
of a rural old-age insurance program. The conventional wisdom that old-age
security was an individual and family matter and the idea that one should raise
children in preparation for one’s old age was widespread in rural China. These
Confucian values supported old-age protection through members of the
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extended family. However, these traditional notions became anachronistic since
the grand social and economic transformation in China, which saw a decline in
birth rates, immense migration from rural to urban areas, and a decline in
family size. By the end of the 1990s, old-age protection in rural China became a
matter of concern for the Chinese government as well as for international and
supranational organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The
State Council and the ADB initiated several pilot projects in 1999 aimed at the
creation of an old-age insurance program in rural China. Liu (2000) has
elaborated the necessity of creating a rural old-age pension program from a
functionalist perspective, and Leisering, Gong, and Hussain (2002) have dis-
cussed the feasibility of a rural old-age pension program and pleaded for filling
the social security gap among the rural elderly.
Unlike the urban old-age insurance program, the rural program was based
on one sole pillar: a funded, defined-contribution pension plan (Liu, 2005; Shi,
2006). The rural old-age pension program designed via various pilot projects
had a voluntary rather than a mandatory flavor. Rural residents could choose to
pay a contribution of between 2 and 20 yuan (0.33 and 3.3 US dollars) monthly,
quarterly, or annually, and the benefit level of the pension was dependent on
the accumulating pension funds and investment returns. Rural residents would
enjoy a pension at their retirement age, receiving payments monthly or quar-
terly. However, they were not legally obliged to participate in the experimental
rural old-age insurance program. Compared with the urban social insurance
program comprising a mandatory PAYGO portion and a mandatory funding
scheme, the rural old-age insurance lacked a social pool. The benefit level was
decided entirely by personal payments into individual accounts. Thus, the
pension entitlement of rural residents was unevenly distributed among regions,
with people of different ages and social classes having different capacities to pay
(Liu, 2005; Shi, Miao, & Wang, 2001).
Due to a lack of trust among rural residents in private pension plans, this
rural pension arrangement failed to take root. The number of participants
peaked at 80 million in 1999, which accounted for only 11% of the rural
population and, thereafter, steadily decreased as rural residents withdrew their
payments from their individual accounts. By 2004, this number had dropped by
one-third, with 53.89 million rural residents participating in the rural old-age
insurance scheme, resulting in the failure of this experiment (Liu, 2005).
Recent developments in the pension arrangement
A national pension plan in a new pension republic
Despite considerable efforts since 1991 to develop and expand the urban old-
age insurance program, the domain of old-age security has been plagued by
problems. First, nearly the entire rural population, which amounts to 800
JOURNAL OF AGING & SOCIAL POLICY 19
million citizens, was excluded from the urban old-age insurance program
while, as mentioned above, only a small number of rural residents were
covered by the rural old-age insurance scheme through local pilot projects.
Further, considering that the urban pension program was earnings-related,
those who were not steadily employed but worked only part-time or inter-
mittently were inexorably excluded from the urban old-age pension program.
Consequently, the pension arrangement in China had a huge coverage gap
until 2005.
In 2002, a generational change took place inside the Communist Party of
China (CPC), as new reformist leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to
power. The Hu-Wen administration fundamentally adjusted the neoliberal
course of their predecessors by means of immense investments in the domain
of social protection. This new policy was dubbed the “care-for-the-people
policy” by Chinese media, and it highlighted the role of social policy, social
protection, social welfare, and the improvement in the well-being of socially
vulnerable groups like migrant workers (Sun & Liu, 2014). The successor of
the Hu-Wen government, the Xi-Li government (Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang),
has even further promoted the equalization of public services to narrow the
social welfare gap, not only among regions but also among social classes. This
novel policy contributed to the expansion of social expenditures, extension of
the social welfare system, and empowerment of the weak and vulnerable.
Along with this expansion of the Chinese welfare sector, the pension arrange-
ment had also been restructured and reorganized, expanding the degree of
coverage significantly.
The new normative value of pension reform drew upon the ideas of equity
and equality. Reformist elites under the Hu-Wen administration adhered to
the value of universalism when seeking to create a novel basic and non-
contributory pension for all those who had not yet been covered by the social
insurance program. The new grand transformation stemmed from a 2008
pilot project in the city of Baoji, in the northwestern province of Shaanxi,
where the local administration experimented with a new pension scheme by
covering local rural residents via a social pension funded through the tax
revenues of the local administration. Besides the basic pension, rural resi-
dents were encouraged to participate in a funded pension plan, which was
heavily subsidized by local governments. As a result, rural residents of Baoji
have been covered by a two-pillar pension plan. This new pilot project was
referred to as the “Baoji model,” and it has been emulated by dozens of cities
(Qing, 2009).
In 2009, the Hu-Wen administration decided to set up a pension plan in
rural regions called the “New Rural Social Pension System,” which combines
a highly subsidized personal savings plan and a non-contributory basic
pension for the rural population. In 2011, the Chinese State Council set
forth an ambitious national plan to create a basic pension for non-employed
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residents in urban regions, combining a funded pension financed by indivi-
dual payments and subsidies from the governments. In 2014, under the Xi-Li
administration, the State Council decided to merge the Urban Residents
Pension Plan and the New Rural Social Pension System into a unified basic
pension insurance plan for urban and rural residents; most rural residents
and non-employed urban residents were now covered by one national social
pension plan.
The new universal pension plan is distinctly different from previous
pension arrangements. First, this new pension is a non-contributory pension,
disconnected from personal payments, pension contributions, and working
career. Recent studies regarding this kind of social pension scheme indicate
that this program is one of the most popular programs of social cash transfer
among developing and transition nations (Leisering, 2009). However, most of
these nations have adopted a means-tested social pension, in which only
impoverished older people in need are entitled to a social pension (such as in
the case of India, South Africa, and urban areas in Brazil; see Leisering, Buhr,
& Traiser-Diop, 2006). Only a small number of nations, including China,
have adopted a universal non–means-tested pension. The third feature is a
comparatively low benefit level. The social pension in China amounts to
barely 9 US dollars monthly (the local government can top up this minimum
benefit), while the benefit level of the social pension in South Africa and
Brazil is comparatively high (128 US dollars and 318 US dollars per month,
respectively) (Barrientos, 2013; Weible & Leisering, 2012).
Analytical overview of recent pension reforms in China
Through the creation of the universal pension scheme, theoretically, each
Chinese citizen is entitled to participate in the pension arrangement as of
2014. Despite the scope of universal coverage, the depth of universalism is
insufficient or “incomplete.” Meanwhile, with the introduction of new pen-
sion reform in 2015 and the previous fusion of the rural and urban social
pension schemes, it is encouraging to see that the stratification of the Chinese
pension arrangement is becoming flattened. A trend analysis of recent pen-
sion reforms is presented as follows.
The “ordinance establishing a unified basic pension insurance system for
urban and rural residents”was adopted in 2014. This reform attempts to merge
the two pension schemes in urban and rural China into a universal one. This
pension plan is based on a non-contributory social pension and a personal
pension heavily subsidized by governments at different administrative levels.
Nearly 498million people were covered by this pension plan by the end of 2013
(MOHRSS, 2014b). With the introduction of this pension plan, the Chinese
government has realized the political will of a universal coverage pension
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arrangement. However, we argue that the so-called universal coverage repre-
sents a case of “incomplete” universalism for three reasons.
First, the benefit amount of this plan is very low, with a country average of
81 yuan (13 US dollars) per month (MOHRSS, 2014c), which is much lower
than the benefit level of other forms of social assistance such as the
Minimum Living Standard Schemes.
Moreover, the pension plan reflects enormous regional disparities. The
central government has set the benefit level at a minimum of 55 yuan (9 US
dollars) per month, but local administrations can add supplementary remu-
neration according to their financial condition or the local cost of living.
Thus, the benefit levels vary between regions. Figure 1 illustrates the pension
benefits of several cities, with Shanghai setting its pensions at 540 yuan (88
US dollars) per month, whereas in Kunming, pensioners receive 84 yuan (14
US dollars).
Finally, the pension plan in rural China can be deemed conditional due to
the phenomenon of the “policy bundle” (zheng ce kun bang). Some studies
have noted that this distinctively Chinese phenomenon is prevalent in certain
rural regions: In a household, the elderly can only receive a monthly social
pension if their adult children have already participated in the rural old-age
Figure 1. Monthly benefit level of social pensions in different regions of China in 2014.
Source: Compiled by the authors based on various data from http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/.
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insurance program (Mei, 2010; Yang, 2010). Local party cadres have used the
new social pension scheme as a coercive method, obliging middle-aged rural
residents to contribute to local pension arrangements. This local practice has
been widespread in those regions at the lowest level of the administrative
structure (counties, townships, villages), where the participation rate for
contribution-based rural old-age insurance programs is comparatively low.
The social meaning of “universalism” has thus been partially weakened.
Through this deliberate bundling of pensions, the participation rate may
increase, which is considered a political achievement for local party cadres.
The emergence of the policy bundle confirms a famous Chinese idiom:
Higher authorities have policies; localities have countermeasures (shangyou
zhengce, xiayou duice). However, this policy bundle remains a local practice,
which has been widely criticized in social media for its lack of legal founda-
tion (Yang, 2010). Some provinces, for example, Shandong Province, have
taken measures to abandon this practice, enabling local residents to file a
complaint at the provincial Office of Human Resources and Social Security if
the local governments oblige adult children’s participation in order to let
their parents receive the pension.
The latest pension reform in China was instituted on January 14, 2015.
The State Council issued the “decision concerning pension reform in the
government and public institutions,” which represents a historical milestone
for China’s pension arrangement. It provides for abolition of the wholly
state-funded government pension and the end of the dual urban old-age
pension arrangements. Around 40 million civil servants and public-sector
employees (such as teachers, doctors, and science researchers),3 have been
brought under the same pension rules as employees in enterprises,4 and they
must make pension contributions. That is, employees must pay 8% of their
gross income, while administrative and public institutions pay another 20%
as pension contributions.
This reform strips civil servants and public-sector employees of their
privileged status, and the inequality between them and employees in enter-
prises is eliminated. Chinese Vice Premier Ma Kai stated, “This reform will
make the social pension scheme fairer and more sustainable” (GOV, 2015). It
is worth noting, however, that pension stratification among different social
classes still exists, for example, in the difference among urban residents, rural
residents, and migrant workers.
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the pension arrangement in China, discussing its
recently established universal, non-contributory pension scheme. We have
characterized the recent pension reform as a case of flattened stratification
and incomplete universalism.
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The Communist pension program in the Mao era was a stratified system
associated with the social welfare classes in the Communist hierarchy and
based on Communist welfare ideology. Since the reform and opening up, the
pension arrangement in China has retained its stratified and unequal nature,
and the past pension legacy has shaped subsequent reforms. Recently, the
Chinese government has made significant efforts to institute pension reform,
which has led to the remarkable achievement of universal coverage, by
entitling formerly excluded rural residents and non-employed urban resi-
dents to a universal, non-contributory pension (see Table 1). Nearly 860
million Chinese residents have been covered by one of the three pension
schemes, which accounts for 86% of the total adult population. The urban
pension programs have already achieved nearly full coverage of the urban
adult population. Currently, some 463 million rural residents, or an esti-
mated 80% of the total rural adult population, are covered by the new social
pension scheme, which had covered only 33.26 million rural residents in
2009. Despite the ostensible universal coverage, we argue that the recent
reforms reflect flattened stratification and incomplete universalism.
First, although the Chinese pension arrangement remains stratified, it is
less stratified than before (Figure 2). Through the elimination of the dual
urban pension program and the establishment of a unified non-contributory
pension in both urban and rural regions, the stratification of the Chinese
pension arrangement has been flattened. For instance, the wholly state-
funded government pension for civil servants and public-sector employees
Table 1. Reform of the Pension System in China
Year Pension plan Targeted group
Pension
amount
Number of
Participants
1955a Regulations for civil servant
retirement
Civil servants and public sector
employees
High 40 million
1991 Circular extending the reform of
the old-age pension system to
employees in enterprises
Employees in enterprises Middle 322 million
2009b Decision of the State Council on
new rural social pension system
Rural residents Low 463 million
2011b Decision of the State Council on a
basic insurance for non-employed
urban residents
Non-employed urban residents Low 35 million
2014 Ordinance establishing a unified
basic pension system for urban
and rural residents
Urban and rural residents Low 498 million
2015 Decision of the State Council on
pension reform in government
and public institutions
Civil servants and public sector
employees
Middle 40 million
aAbolished in 2015.
bAbolished in 2014.
Source. Compiled by the authors.
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has been abolished, making them subject to the same pension rules as
employees in enterprises.
Second, despite the government’s assertion that a pension arrangement
with universal coverage has been established in China, we argue that it is
actually a case of incomplete universalism. Even though the scheme purports
universal coverage, the depth of the universalism is insufficient. First, the
benefit level of social pension is very low, 81 yuan (13 US dollars) per month
on average. This amount is far less than enough to ensure a basic livelihood
for elderly people, and in many cases, it is much lower than the benefit level
of other forms of social assistance. Moreover, the benefit level varies from
region to region. For example, the pension benefit in Shanghai is five times
higher than that in Kunming. Finally, the “policy bundle” found in some
parts of rural China mitigates universal coverage by tying the receipt of a
pension to the coercive participation of beneficiaries’ adult children in the
rural old-age insurance program. This bundling of policy has thus made a so-
called universal pension a conditional one in some regions.
Historical experiences from Western welfare states and global pension
reform suggest that a universal pension arrangement does not necessarily
mean more redistribution and better old age protection; for example, an
extremely low level of universalism can also result in the shifting of state
responsibility to the private savings of individual households. The state
has merely defined the minimal responsibility for the protection of its
citizens, leaving the major task of old-age protection to the individual. In
this vein, a low level of universalism can also justify a minimal degree of
state responsibility or even state retrenchment. It is still uncertain how
The pension system  
in China 
Basic Old-Age 
Pension for Civil 
Servants
Old-Age Insurance 
for the Urban 
Employees 
Old-Age Pension Plan 
for Urban and Rural 
Residents
Old-Age Insurance 
for Urban Residents
New Rural Social 
Pension System
Figure 2. The pension system in contemporary China. In 2015, Basic Old Age Pension for Civil
Servants was abolished, and civil servants are now subject to Old-Age Insurance for Urban
Employees. In 2014, Old-Age Insurance for Urban Residents and the New Rural Social Pension
system were merged into one unified pension plan called Old-Age Pension for Urban and Rural
Residents. Source: Compiled by the authors.
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China will develop in the future; much depends on how the notion of
“universalism” will continue to be defined by the Chinese epistemic
community. Clearly, more researches are needed to explore prospective
pension development.
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Notes
1. In “Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth,” the
World Bank pleaded for a multi-pillar pension system involving a tax-financed basic
pension as the first pillar, a mandatory funded pension as the second pillar, and private
savings for retirement as the third pillar (World Bank, 1994).
2. The contribution rate has constantly changed after the adoption of the partial funding
system; currently, employers pay 11% to 20% of the employees’ gross income, and
employees contribute 8% to 11%. The contribution rates vary slightly according to
region (Wu, 2013).
3. Veterans who have left the army must make pension contributions in their new
workplace, just like other employees. The only bonus for their military service is that
the period of service is considered a pension contribution period.
4. See the “circular extending the reform of the old-age insurance system to employees of
the private sector.” In 2013, 322 million employees in enterprises participated in this
pension plan (MOHRSS, 2014a).
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